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The Authoritarian Gambit

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Venezuela is in the midst of a protracted, bitter, often violent, and sometimes deadly struggle to determine what kind of society and government it will have and what kind of future Venezuelans can hope for. At the time of writing (mid-August 2017) it is too early to know how this struggle will turn out, or what the process will be like until some more or less settled pattern emerges. But it is not too early to know what the regime and opposition want, to identify the tools with which they work, and to be clear about what they hope for and what they fear.

This regime wants above all to stay in power. Its principal leaders and enablers (army, national guard, police and political police, and paramilitaries) fear a loss of power which would limit their access to goods and funds, and make them vulnerable to legal and political processes, for example for violations of human rights, corruption, or drug trafficking.

As to tools, this has been an evolving process. President Maduro clearly has exercised control of the executive branch of government, including institutions that monitor and control elections, he has relied on a compliant judiciary, and counted on a range of security (better called “insecurity”) forces that have played an active role in harassment and repression of the opposition.

What the regime no longer enjoys is the popular support that carried Hugo Chávez to a succession of electoral victories, the last when he was clearly dying of cancer. After Chávez’s death in early 2013, Maduro (his designated successor) was elected president by a tiny (and contested) margin. Since that time the regime has lost successive elections at the local and regional level and lost control of the National Assembly, where the opposition

gained an absolute majority in December 2015.

What to do when electoral success becomes questionable and elections are no longer a reliable source of power or legitimation? The first step is to disqualify opposing candidates on charges of corruption, or “incitation to violence,” or “failure to carry out their duties.” If opposition candidates win anyway, a second step is to disqualify elected officials. This has been the case of numerous mayors and of three deputies from Amazonas whose disqualification kept the opposition from acquiring a supermajority (required to pass “organic laws”) after gaining control in the electoral landslide of 2015. When the Assembly passes laws, a further step has been to have the courts disqualify them (numerous laws were declared unconstitutional on issues from amnesty to land title). If the problem persists, a next to final resort is to have the courts declare the Assembly in rebellion and try to shut it down. This is what sparked the round of protests that began in early 2017 and continue to the present.

The Bolivarian constitution of 1999 provides an elaborate mechanism for removing the president from office through a recall election. What can be done if the opposition gathers the required signatures and looks likely to force a recall election? The first response, used ably by Chávez himself when facing a recall vote in 2004, is to engage in a series of delays and sequential changes of rules while strengthening the regime’s position with economic benefits. But the current economic situation is so bad, and the government’s popularity so low, that these do not appear sufficient. So what to do? The answer has been that if all else fails, simply cancel elections indefinitely. At this point the regime abandoned democracy.

With electoral means put off the table and the very existence of the national assembly threatened, ordinary political means lack validity, and the opposition turned to massive and continuous public demonstrations and civic strikes which have become a constant presence in national life. Faced with such sustained opposition, what tools remain to the regime? The first choice has been repression and intimidation—mass arrests of activists (tried in military courts), arrests of political prisoners in the middle of the night, and active, violent harassment of demonstrators and opposition figures by police and proregime paramilitaries.

Let us be clear. The overwhelming weight of violence, the overwhelming control and use of the means of violence, lies in the hands of the regime. Aided by paramilitary groups, official forces (like the army, police, national guard, and political police) deploy considerable force every day against manifestations and members of the opposition.

If violence is not sufficient to quell protests, the next step, given the opposition’s use of the constitution to legitimate its actions, has been to scrap the constitution and start over. Hence the process of “electing” and installing a National Constituent Assembly (vote July 30, installation immediately after). This was no ordinary election: candidates were preselected by the regime; no opposing views were represented. Moreover, in contrast to the Constituent Assembly that launched the Chávez period, there was no referendum to decide whether or not such an assembly should be elected in the first place. This is an assembly imposed from above and designed to create a fortified, armored authoritarian system. It is important to realize that a constituent assembly is a unique kind of legislature, with no preset limits or

controls, empowered to abolish all existing institutions, remove all existing officials, and start from scratch. The Constituent Assembly began in this way, asserting its general authority and disqualifying or ousting opponents.

The preceding comments show the regime working to hold on to power through an escalating series of measures, always accompanied by violence. If these are the goals and tools of the regime, what of the opposition? The short-term goals of the opposition remain clear: to remove the president by legal and constitutional means, hold new elections, free political prisoners, and restart the economy by loosening controls and reopening international ties. All these have been laid out in legislation regularly swatted away by the Supreme Court. As the electoral ground has gradually been constricted or eliminated, and in the face of attacks on the National Assembly and harassment of deputies and other elected officials, the opposition has turned to massive, continuous public protests in an effort to rally and consolidate support and keep the issues on the public (national and transnational) agenda. In these the opposition has been successful, but the regime hangs on, entrenched behind its security forces and now with a Constituent Assembly to provide a legal foundation more to its liking.

How this contest will work out is difficult to predict in detail. For the regime the choice is clear: double down on authoritarian rule or risk losing everything. The Constituent Assembly is the vehicle for that doubling down. It is impossible to know precisely what the Assembly will come up with, but some informed speculation is in order: assert control of all institutions; continue to provide for elections but with severe controls on access,

participation, venues, and candidates. There will be tightened controls over media, information, and freedom of movement and association. The regime will crack down on independent social movements, particularly those that monitor events; shut down external funding; accelerate repression and imprisonment of activists, protesters, and opposition officials; accentuate all economic controls; and increase the already significant role of the military in all production and distribution of essentials like food and medicine.

Will the authoritarian gambit work? For how long? Similar efforts to stabilize authoritarian rule have worked, sometimes lasting for a very long time. Regimes of this kind face a few great perils. Free elections of any kind, including referenda, are dangerous (*viz* Nicaragua in 1990, Chile in 1988, Uruguay in 1980).¹ So we can expect elections to be controlled. Sustained internal opposition threatens to raise the cost of control to an excessive level. So we can expect more repression. Continued, accelerated economic decay will further fuel opposition and out-migration. We can also expect escalating violence and serial defections from the ruling coalition (e.g., military officers, public officials), which can probably be contained, at least for a while.

The options for the opposition are above all to maintain unity, sustain a public presence, avoid provocations, and mobilize and coordinate support within the country and from international sources. Venezuela is already very isolated internationally in both political and economic terms. Numerous governments and transnational groups (Mercosur, the European Union, the UN, and the Vatican) have condemned the destruction of democracy and declined to recognize the Constituent Assembly.² International carriers have cut service, and trade including petroleum exports is likely

to suffer further, damaging the capacity of the regime to provide for basic needs. The end result will be further damage to the well-being of Venezuelans. This is going to be a rough, costly, and likely violent ride, so buckle up.

Supporters of the regime argue that the troubles of Venezuela all stem from an economic war against the country being waged by imperialism. This story rings hollow to anyone who looks at the facts, including the government's own statistics. The only indices that have consistently gone up over the last five years are inflation (the highest in the world), poverty, deaths by violence, scarcity, out-migration (two million Venezuelans already in self-imposed exile³), and infectious disease, with the return of once eliminated diseases like malaria, dengue fever, cholera, and chikungunya. Essential services from transport to electricity, potable water to public health, not to mention availability of food and medicines, have all collapsed. The regular repetition of the claim that it is all somebody else's fault reminds one of Groucho Marx's famous line in the movie *Duck Soup*. When faced with someone he is unable to convince of something clearly absurd, who will not swallow a half-baked story, Groucho's character, Rufus T. Firefly, asks: "You gonna believe me or you gonna believe your lying eyes?"

I prefer to believe my eyes. I believe in facts—what we can see with our eyes and with the tools of political and social analysis. The facts are as outlined above: a struggle between a regime desperate to hold on to power by any means and working to consolidate a more secure and lasting authoritarianism, and an opposition hoping to restore political democracy and civil and social liberties. These are the facts. Hopefully LASA as an institution committed to democracy and human

Medium- and Short-Term Historical Causes of Venezuela's Crisis

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rights will take a principled stand and unequivocally condemn the destruction of democracy in Venezuela, a process unfolding before our horrified eyes.

Notes

- ¹ The Sandinistas lost power in 1990 when Daniel Ortega was defeated in presidential elections by Violeta Chamorro. Military plans for indefinite rule were defeated in plebiscites in Chile (1988) and Uruguay (1980). Democratic government was restored following free elections in both countries (elections in Chile in December 1989, elections in Uruguay in November 1984).
- ² Cf. the Declaration of Lima (August 8, 2017), signed by foreign ministers and representatives of Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, and Paraguay. On the same day, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights denounced widespread torture and abuse of human rights by the Maduro regime.
- ³ A. Torres, P. De Lllano, A. Marcos, and G. Ballesteros, "El Chavismo lleva al exilio a más de dos millones de Venezolanos," *El País*, August 13, 2017. ■

I have conducted research in Venezuela since the early days of Hugo Chávez's presidency, when his movement was idealistic and optimistic. At the time, as a burgeoning scholar of nineteenth-century Latin American history, I wanted to work in a country that would be a safe location to conduct my research. I had traveled throughout Central America and the Andes in the 1980s and had seen the travesties of civil war and drug violence. In contrast, since the 1970s scholars had written about "Venezuelan exceptionalism" in reference to the country's use of oil revenues to foster stable democracy and socioeconomic development, successfully avoiding the military dictatorships and extreme violence that plagued Latin America in the 1970s–1990s. On my first trip to Venezuela, as a graduate student in the year 2000, I saw a stable democracy with a comparatively high standard of living, which I assumed would remain a safe location for me to conduct my research. This turned out to be a poor prediction. The country now is either a failed state or close to it and has among the highest rates of homicide and kidnapping in the world. The last five years mark the country's harshest descent in terms of political, economic, and living standards since its war of independence (1810–1823), when it lost one-third of the population.

So how did we get here? A full answer is beyond the scope of this essay. Nonetheless, an exploration of weaknesses in Venezuelan democracy since its inception in 1958, along with recent governmental policies, point toward some key observations. Since well before *chavismo*, Venezuelan governments have lacked accountability to their citizens and have been highly corrupt. Also, rather than foster sustainable economic policies, these governments have focused on consolidating power unto themselves. The current regime has

accelerated these trends, and in so doing has caused far greater damage than the previous administrations.

To understand present-day Venezuela we should return to 1958, when a coalition of civilians and military personnel ousted Marcos Pérez Jiménez, the country's last military dictator. Then the country's three main political parties met and signed the Pact of Punto Fijo, which laid the groundwork for democratic governments for decades to come. Under this pact, elected governments would include members from different parties sitting in the president's cabinet and the legislature, and they would exclude parties from the far right and far left. Labor leaders also signed the pact, agreeing to work with state and industrial leaders to negotiate agreement without resorting to violence or strikes. *Puntofijismo* sought to create stable, moderate governments that could defend themselves against radicals from the right or the left. In many ways, it worked for almost four decades. Aside from a comparatively small leftist-guerrilla movement in the 1960s, this country weathered the remainder of the Cold War as a peaceful constitutional democracy.

Nonetheless, serious social, economic, and political problems emerged under *puntofijismo*, which persist to this day. Here I will address two of these problems. The first was a lack of government accountability to its citizens. In theory, a democratic citizenry can affect state policy through voting or refusing to pay taxes. In Venezuela, however, the ruling parties did not need citizen support as much as access to petrodollars that could be used to continue ineffective policies, curry favors, and buy votes. Politicians thus were often immune to the pressures from a discontented citizenry. This disconnect from popular opinion became even stronger

after the government nationalized the oil in 1976 and created a semiautonomous corporation to run the industry (PDVSA). As a result, the ideology of a political party or politician became less important than their ability to access the oil money. Most political struggles concerned factional rivalries and patronage over access to petroleum dollars, not substantive policy debates. Even by Latin American standards, the Venezuelan government was notoriously corrupt. These problems led to severe social and economic problems as the majority of the population remained in poverty and the national debt rose.

Puntofijismo also lacked a culture of “loyal opposition.” This term implies that different political parties will compete over substantive ideological differences but will recognize each other as legitimate and loyal to the constitution. The various parties can openly disagree with each other over priorities, policy, and strategy, but the minority party recognizes the legitimacy of the dominant party and its state apparatus. The premise of loyal opposition is key to a democratic system, as it allows for stability even in a multiparty system in which partisans openly debate, compete, and experiment with new solutions.

Under puntofijismo, the parties accepted each other and cooperated, so they may have appeared to embrace the notion of loyal opposition. In reality, however, they cooperated to such an extent that there was not a true opposition party or meaningful ideological debate. The parties formally shared power, even a minority party could partake in the executive branch, and the labor movement also participated. As a result, there was a virtual monopoly of power enjoyed by the main parties and unions, like a cartel that promoted cooperation, more than a vigorous debate about the country’s

ills. By the 1980s–1990s, the ideological distinctions between the parties had become so meaningless that politicians opportunistically jumped from one party to another. There was no real opposition to the administration based on different ideology, nor was there a meaningful national debate in which different parties distinguished themselves in substantive ways.

This lack of government accountability and of a loyal opposition have continued to plague the era of chavismo. When Chávez came to power in 1998, he promised to create a new, better system. A fragmented opposition emerged, including many leftists, composed of people who disliked Chávez’s policies and authoritarian leanings, or who just wanted to regain power. In the absence of a political culture of loyal opposition, the debate quickly devolved into hatred and bigotry. From the beginning, chavistas and anti-chavistas labeled each other as irrational, evil, self-serving, anticonstitutional, and seditious. Both sides dehumanized the other as an unreasonable enemy with whom debate was impossible; neither side treated the other as fundamentally loyal. And both sides pushed each other to greater extremes of brinkmanship. Though some people made sincere efforts to foster reasoned debate, they were too few and the political institutions were of little help. For its part, the opposition became insurrectionary. Living in Caracas during 2002, I was shocked to see how the country’s largest news outlets (TV and newspapers) not only showed a blatant anti-chavista bias, but also openly called for rebellion, including moments when headlines called upon the military to rebel. I also learned, from conversations with personnel at the US embassy, that regular civilians occasionally visited the embassy and begged the US to invade. Chávez did not imprison these

partisans, though by any standard of free speech laws such actions were illegal. He responded with yet more populist demagoguery, which further provoked the opposition.

In 2003–2004, chavismo defeated the opposition and sought more power centralized on the charismatic president. Chávez went on to take control over PDVSA, the oil company lost its autonomy, and his administration gained direct access to the petrodollars. Having defanged the opposition, chavistas did not use the opportunity to strengthen institutions, shore up the constitution, and foster national unity. Instead, chavista politicians and administrators, still idealistic but already corrupt, fell into the old trap. Party insiders stole from public coffers and fought among themselves not so much for policies that would genuinely help the population but rather for power and oil money.

More recently, how did the government drive the country off the cliff? After all, in the early 2000s, chavismo was not so violent and repressive as it is now, and the economic conditions were not so desperate. Did the current crisis begin when Chávez died and Nicolás Maduro became president (in 2013)? Or when oil prices fell precipitously (in 2014)? No. Well before he died, Chávez laid the roots of the current crisis. Assuredly Maduro is more heavy-handed than Chávez and lacks his charisma, and under Maduro’s leadership conditions have declined more rapidly. Still, Chávez shares the blame along with his successor.

A key ingredient to the current crisis is that Chávez devised political-economic policies that served to concentrate power on himself and his party rather than to promote economic sustainability. Of

course, Chávez built a loyal base through his charisma and by speaking for the poor masses. In addition, he helped ensure the people's loyalty by weakening institutions and making the population yet more economically dependent on an authoritarian government. None of his large state projects created sectors that are economically autonomous or sustainable. On the contrary, chavismo used petrodollars to reduce the independence of state institutions and make the citizenry more dependent on the central government. Predictably, such a strategy functioned only as long as the state enjoyed a superabundance of cash. We see this trend in a number of instances, such as when Chávez imposed fiscal restrictions, weakened the private sector, augmented the welfare state, co-opted his detractors, and built alliances with the military.

These days, perhaps the most glaring example of this trend are fiscal policies that Chávez imposed. Here I will not focus on the official exchange rate, which has been a contentious issue since at least 1983, but rather I will discuss how Chávez imposed strict limits over how much foreign currency individuals and corporations could purchase. These restrictions weakened the private sector, which served his larger struggle against capitalism. Also, as a practical matter, these limitations sought to prevent *sacadólares*, a term for when rich Latin Americans convert their local currency to foreign currency (e.g., dollars or euros) and then deposit it into foreign banks, which can devalue the local currency and spark inflation.

Far from preventing inflation, however, the policy to limit access to foreign currency has been disastrous. When private citizens and businesses cannot acquire foreign currency, private sector exchange becomes nearly impossible. All companies

in Venezuela must import foreign parts and supplies. However, foreign exporters don't want to sell their wares for *bolívares*, but rather insist on dollars or euros. So, a small, local T-shirt-producing company, or a large foreign company like Ford or Pfizer, could no longer access the foreign currency to import the necessary parts and supplies. More recently, the government has expropriated nearly any private company that somehow survived. Consequently, the private sector has collapsed. The *bolívar* has become virtually worthless; inflation in 2017 is expected to be 700–800 percent, among the highest in the world. Venezuela has plentiful fertile land, but for decades the landowners and state have preferred to invest in petroleum rather than food production. Thus, agriculture has withered and the population depends on imported food. At this point, the country no longer has an industrial or agricultural base, and the importers cannot import essentials because they don't have foreign currency. As a result, people are now dying from hunger and lack of medicine.

As Chávez created a climate hostile to private businesses, he enlarged welfare programs and increased dependence on the state. The government itself provided schools, housing, and medicine to millions of poor people. We saw similar programs under the *puntofijismo* regimes, though the previous regimes also encouraged foreign investment and cultivated private ownership. Chávez built social welfare services with greater intensity and simultaneously attacked the private sector, which caused unemployment to rise, and then supported the poor with handouts. In short, these government programs did not create economically independent citizens but rather fostered dependence on the chavista regime. These programs were never sustainable because they generated no financial return, but they created a base

of people dependent on, and therefore loyal to, the party.

Oddly enough, the tactics against the private sector helped to silence many of chavismo's detractors. Over the past decade, in conversations with dozens of people from different regions and socioeconomic strata, I have heard a similar story: As private-sector jobs dried up, more and more people took public-sector jobs as their only alternative. People who hated chavismo now worked for the government. In order to keep their jobs, they had to attend chavista rallies, wear the party's red, and cheer. Further, they even voted for PSUV (the current iteration of the chavista ruling party) candidates because they feared that if a different party took office, the new managers would purge the old employees and they would lose their jobs. Most recently, news outlets showed high-ranking government officials that threatened to fire public employees unless they voted in the July 30, 2017, election for the Constituent Assembly. Given that the opposition sought to boycott the election and the constitution does not require citizens to vote, this pressure was not a nonpartisan, neutral attempt to increase participation. These threats coerce workers to betray their principles and political preferences in order to keep their jobs. Economic policies that have ravaged the private sector have promoted dependence on and loyalty to the government among both supporters and opponents.

Chávez's policies regarding the military also served to concentrate power and erode long-term institutional strength. Under *puntofijismo*, the armed forces remained professional and detached from party politics. In contrast, Chávez purged the military's officer corps and replaced it with supporters. To increase loyalty, Chávez appointed officers to political offices and

brought the armed forces into his political programs. Also, in 2004, soon after the purge, military spending rose dramatically for a decade (it started to decline in 2014, when the price of oil dropped). These policies eroded the professionalization of the armed forces and added to an unmanageably large national debt. Nonetheless, they allowed entrepreneurial officers to enrich themselves through embezzlement and forged the military into a wing of the PSUV. The marriage of the PSUV and the military created a nearly impregnable coalition.

Chavismo did not create this country's problems. Nonetheless, it shaped a government that is even more corrupt and less accountable than previous administrations. At this point, in this large country blessed with natural wealth, there is no corner that can escape the spreading indigence. ■

From the Program Co-chair

by Charles F. Walker, LASA2018 program co-chair | University of California Davis | cfwalker@ucdavis.edu

When the LASA Executive Committee discussed the possibility of holding the 2018 Congress in Barcelona, members expressed delight about organizing the first LASA in Europe in a city and region with a rich history and culture, innumerable attractions, affordable public transit and culinary options, and easy access to other European cities. What worried the committee was whether the cost and distance of flights from the Americas would discourage participation, particularly from Latin America and the West Coast of the United States. Some wondered if the attendance would plummet. The pessimists were proven wrong, however, as LASA received a record number of applications for the Barcelona Congress. This indicates that we will have a large, robust conference, but it also means that many who have applied will not be accepted; the proverbial good news/bad news.

First, the numbers, based on comparisons with the very large New York Congress in 2016. The number of individual panels rose by 30 percent while panels and events stayed almost the same, growing 1 percent. Membership from 2015 to 2017 skyrocketed by 40 percent, reaching 16,730 in September 2017. Members from Latin American and the Caribbean continue to lead, with just under 50 percent of the total membership. North America (United States and Canada) is next. Not surprisingly in light of the upcoming Congress in Catalonia, Europeans now make up a significant part of LASA, with almost 1,500 members. Membership from Asia is also rising. The presidential panels, discussed below, address the expanding interest and participation in LASA in Europe, Asia, and Russia.

	New York 2016	Barcelona 2018	Increase (%)
Individual proposals	2,307	2,989	30
Panel and event proposals	1,524	1,541	1
Travel funding requests	1,403	2,550	82
Membership (at time of proposal deadline)	11,947	16,730	40

Requests for travel funds also increased greatly: from 1,403 for New York to 2,550 for Barcelona. LASA continues to fund-raise and to search for ways to make the Congress affordable. Many international conferences offer no student discount or travel subsidies. For LASA2017 in Lima, over 700 participants benefitted from some sort of aid. I hope these numbers will encourage you to donate to LASA or your favorite section and to request that your university or organization help in some way. I would also like to share one more statistic: the LASA offices in Pittsburgh received 3,036 emails in the two weeks leading up to the deadline, most of them panicked questions about the submission process. Kudos to the great staff for their hard work and thanks to LASA members for their patience.

Now the bad news. The high number of applicants and the limited space in the Barcelona venues will mean that acceptance rates will drop. Many fine panels and individual papers will be turned down. LASA is working hard to find additional venues near the Barcelona convention center, but other conferences are taking place at the same time and the popularity of Barcelona means that availability is always limited. LASA hopes to find more space but a record number of applications will mean a relatively high rejection rate.

The Program Committee has put together seven excellent presidential panels with prominent participants. The topics include the following:

- Migraciones, guerra fría y solidaridad: Estudios de América Latina desde Europa
- Repensando las relaciones entre América Latina y Europa: Entre desigualdades interdependientes y “cooperaciones” para transiciones civilizatorias
- 1968: 50 Years After
- Los estudios latinoamericanos en Asia y Rusia
- La prensa bajo fuego
- Reflexiones sobre la producción cultural y conocimiento en el siglo XXI
- Memory Studies from the Americas and Spain in a Globalized World

These panels bring together an excellent group of specialists from Asia, Europe, Latin America, the Caribbean, Russia, and North America, with more than a dozen disciplines represented. We look forward to sharing more details in December.

Finally, LASA members are asking what the current situation in Catalonia will mean for the Congress. As I write this (October 9) nothing indicates that it will affect the Congress. Protests have been nonviolent, and the recent aggression by Spanish police appears to be an aberration and not the beginning of escalated violence. All sides in

Congress Survey Report

by ANGELINA COTLER, LASA Director of Membership and Development

Catalonia have expressed their resolve not to disrupt Barcelona's booming tourism economy. (On the other hand, many people in Barcelona are tired of tourists overwhelming the city, outnumbering locals in many spaces. This has led to some tourist-bashing but also some creative efforts to search for ways to improve coexistence and to guarantee that tourism benefits the broad community.)

Like all of you, we are following the news from Spain closely, but we do not believe that the recent events pose a threat to the success of the Congress. We are looking forward to the Barcelona Congress on May 23–26, 2018. It's an exciting place and certainly an exciting time. ■

Our 51st Congress in Lima, Peru, was filled with exciting panels, stimulating debates, and wonderful networking opportunities. Overall, from our perspective, it was a successful Congress. We were honored to welcome 6,620 registered participants, 1,680 local students, and 3,816 members who presented their research at the Pontificia Universidad Católica in Lima. It is significant to note that 29% of the members attending were graduate students and 68% of them non-US residents.

Regardless of all the enthusiasm around the Congress we wanted to make sure that our most important constituents, our members, agree on the success of LASA2017, and thus our yearly online survey was sent to collect demographic information, respondents' feedback, and to measure the overall experience during our time in Peru. We thank the 900 attendees who participated in this year's survey, who represent 13.5% of all of the LASA2017 registered participants.

Half of the respondents to this year's survey were Latin American residents and 40% were from the United States and Canada. Similar to previous years, the majority of respondents work primarily on research activities (56%), while 30% focus on education. About one-third of respondents were attending a LASA Congress for the first-time (30%), while 31% of respondents were seasoned attendees, having attended five or more LASA Congresses. Both groups are important to us, as you evaluate the Congress with new lenses as well as with experienced ones.

Most participants (47%) attended between four and seven sessions during the Congress.

Overall, 65% of the survey respondents were satisfied with LASA2017, 16% were neutral, and 19% were dissatisfied. This was a decrease of 12% from last year's satisfaction rate. Based on the feedback, this decrease is likely due to two major reasons: the registration process and small size rooms. We apologize to those who had to endure the wait and thank all for your patience and understanding. LASA is actively working to offer a better service. At the same time, there was an unanimous 95% positive response for having opened the Congress to local students.

We realize that many sessions occur at the same time, some of them on the same topics. Due to the high volume of sessions accepted in order to honor LASA's spirit of inclusiveness, multidisciplinary, and diversity, this overlap is bound to happen. We hope that the multiple simultaneous sessions permit a wide range of session options in which you can participate and grow.

A recurring concern is that room size was inadequate for the number of attendees in a session. Unfortunately, it is impossible for us to predict the number of attendees for a particular session; thus this factor is not usually considered when assigning rooms. Additionally, since LASA2013, to further allow networking opportunities between colleagues in the same disciplines, we started assigning neighboring rooms by program tracks or similar themes. Sometimes this practice risks having small meeting rooms next to each other. However, we have received very positive feedback on having track-designated rooms as it has improved networking opportunities. We hope this additional networking compensates for the sometimes crowded rooms.

On a positive note, 75% of respondents were extremely satisfied with the large attendance at the Congress and the quality of panels.

The survey also sheds light on the advantages and opportunities of attending the annual LASA Congress, which varies for English speakers and Spanish speakers. As a general rule, English speakers were more likely to answer “very much” to the advantages and opportunities questions than Spanish speakers. More than 45% of the respondents considered the Congress to provide a very good opportunity to present and share ideas and/or information with other colleagues. Around 40% of respondents learned a great deal about recent work and topics of discussion in Latin American studies, and close to 60% indicated that they learned very much about recent work in other fields. This is important to note since it emphasizes the interdisciplinarity of the Congress and shows that participants attend panels that are not necessarily in their own fields or disciplines. Fewer than 20% of participants considered that LASA offered a good opportunity to attend governance and/or business meetings. This reflects a lack of interest among members in engaging in the LASA policy-making process. Around 50% of respondents considered that the LASA Congress is a great opportunity to network and establish contacts with colleagues.

Regarding the use of technology, 70% of respondents downloaded the program app and 71% used it. However, many respondents to the survey mentioned that the app didn’t show room numbers and that Wi-Fi connectivity was poor. LASA continues to work with our vendors to make our app as user-friendly as possible.

As in every Congress, LASA is very grateful to our faithful sponsors/foundations and to the Endowment Fund, which continue year after year to provide partial travel grants to our participants. We were able to sponsor over 400 participants this year to come to LASA2017 and share their research.

Finally, around 44% of the survey respondents are planning to attend LASA2018 in Barcelona. We are looking forward seeing you in Barcelona on May 23–26, 2018, for our Congress with the theme “Latin American Studies in a Globalized World.”

We thank all those who took the time to complete the survey. Your feedback helps us improve by acknowledging situations that we may have not been aware of, and thus allows us to focus on our members and their needs. As always, please feel free to reach out to us with any questions or further suggestions. ■

Section Reports 2016–2017 (part 2)

Gender and Feminist Studies

By Erika Márquez y Roberta Villalón,
co-chairs

Informe de la reunión de negocios y recuento del número de personas presentes.

La reunión de negocios se hizo el Domingo 30 de abril de 2017 de 8 a 8:45 p.m. en el Westin Hotel, Salón Urubamba. Desafortunadamente, tuvimos poca afluencia de personas (unas 12) debido, tal vez, a la lejanía entre la Universidad, sede del Congreso, y el hotel. De todas maneras, tratamos los siguientes asuntos:

Discusión de la postura de la sección a propósito de las políticas migratorias de Estados Unidos.

Se ventilaron las propuestas de la membresía de la sección en el sentido de lograr un pronunciamiento individual y contundente de LASA frente a las políticas discriminatorias de Estados Unidos en materia de inmigración, más allá del breve pronunciamiento que hizo en conjunto con otras organizaciones académicas.

Se recordó cómo las políticas migratorias de Estados Unidos perjudican, especialmente, a los latinoamericanos miembros de LASA que viven en Estados Unidos y están bajo estatus precarios como las visas de estudiante. Se anotó que, para estos casos, el pronunciamiento de LASA hubiera podido al menos dar un apoyo a quienes viajaban al Congreso en estas calidades.

Se mencionaron los continuos problemas frente a la tramitación transparente y expedita de inquietudes de la sección. Pese a que existía amplio acuerdo en la sección sobre la necesidad de un pronunciamiento de LASA en cuanto a los

puntos presentados antes, la respuesta de la organización fue que éstas iniciativas deberían someterse al mecanismo de recopilación de firmas físicas para poder que la petición hiciera su trámite como una resolución de la organización, lo que a todas luces es inefectivo o casi imposible.

En relación con estas inquietudes, se mencionó lo problemático que resulta continuar realizando los congresos de LASA en hoteles con trabajadores/as no sindicalizados/as y en cadenas hoteleras con mal record de tratamiento de los y las empleados/as. LASA debe abordar esta situación, que se ha denunciado de manera reiterada entre la membresía.

Elecciones

En el business meeting se eligió a las siguientes representantes de la sección: Co-chairs: Erika Márquez (segundo año), emarquez@icesi.edu.co; Beatriz Padilla (primer año), padilla.beatriz@gmail.com; Secretarias: Mariana Prandini, assim251@newschool.edu; Laura Albaine, lauraalbaine@yahoo.com.ar; Tesorera: Roberta Villalón, villalor@stjohns.edu.

Actividades ejecutadas y próximo período

En términos de la sostenibilidad de la sección, las co-chairs solicitaron fondos a la membresía para complementar el presupuesto que se traía y, al final del período, se terminó con un superávit. El balance de la cuenta de la sección al tiempo previo al Congreso fue de US\$4,320. Después de pagar por la recepción de la sección y por los premios, el balance final para la sección fue de US\$1,549. Este buen desempeño financiero está ligado en buena parte a la nutrida membresía de la sección. Según el último reporte de LASA, tenemos 434 miembros.

Los altos costos de la recepción siguen recordándonos de la necesidad de contar con un comité de pre-conferencia entre cuyas integrantes haya personas de la ciudad sede del Congreso. Esto nos ayudará a economizar en los gastos de pre-conferencia, reunión de negocios y recepción. En Lima, algunas colegas mencionaron que nos ayudarían con sus contactos en Barcelona y se acordó contactar a organizaciones feministas de Barcelona para LASA 2018. Quien pueda facilitar contactos como éstos, por favor debe comunicarse con las co-chairs Erika y Beatriz.

En cuanto a actividades, en 2016 se organizaron los cuatro paneles autorizados por LASA para la sección en el Congreso de Lima 2017. Éstos fueron seleccionados por las co-chairs entre un excelente grupo de contribuciones.

Igualmente, la sección organizó su pre-conferencia en conjunto con la Sección de Sexualidades bajo el título “Diálogo de saberes y feminismos latinoamericanos”. El encuentro fue el 28 de abril de 2017 en la Casa de la Literatura de Lima. En ese espacio, se presentaron dos paneles por sección más uno conjunto, académico-activista, sobre la temática de “Ni una menos”. Los paneles de nuestra Sección de Género y Estudios Feministas recogieron contribuciones alrededor de los ejes “Saberes, educación superior y producción de conocimiento” y “Movilizaciones, estrategias, discursos: Activismo y academia”.

Durante el período 2016–2017, la sección mantuvo una conversación sobre aspectos relacionados con la gobernanza de LASA y la necesidad de que la organización se manifestara sobre los cambios políticos y electorales que están afectando de manera crítica a los y las migrantes de

Latinoamérica. Las co-chairs mantuvieron el diálogo abierto a través del list-serve de la sección y elaboraron varias comunicaciones dirigidas a los órganos de gobierno de LASA en nombre de la membresía en cuanto a temas críticos para todos/as como por ejemplo la necesidad de proteger a las/los miembros/os de la sección que estuvieran viajando al congreso bajo visas de estudiante u otros estatus migratorios precarios. Así mismo, discutieron la necesidad de contar con mecanismos expeditos para que la membresía pueda expresar sus inquietudes ante LASA y, a su vez, para que la organización se pronuncie cuando haya asuntos de política nacional o internacional que afecten los valores centrales de la organización, tales como el respeto de los derechos humanos y de los pueblos.

En ese sentido, la principal línea de trabajo de las co-chairs en diálogo con la sección fue mantener la participación y mediar entre ésta y las autoridades de LASA con el fin de promover una organización más democrática y solidaria. Igualmente, se promovieron declaraciones firmadas por la membresía de la sección en apoyo a los maestros y maestras mexicanos afectados por la privatización de la educación y la militarización de la protesta, y se empezó a discutir el apoyo a una colega brasilera afectada por acusaciones de grupos ultra conservadores en el marco de la discusión sobre la llamada ideología de género.

Para el próximo período, se espera aumentar la membresía de la sección a través de llamados que hagamos a nuestros miembros y sus redes institucionales y activistas. Con eso, podremos también mantener nuestros fondos para realizar la pre-conferencia en Barcelona y garantizar la entrega de los premios. Por otra parte, deberemos activar un comité de personas afiliadas a la sección o a LASA que

tengan cercanía con la sede del Congreso 2018 para que nos ayuden a concretar la logística de la pre-conferencia. Se espera también mantener la agenda usual de la sección en términos de la organización de paneles para el congreso entre julio y agosto, la organización de la pre-conferencia, y la selección de ganadores/as para los premios. En la medida de lo posible, consideraremos la concesión de becas de viaje para estudiantes de la sección.

Premios de la sección

La Sección de Género y Estudios Feministas otorgó los premios Elsa Chaney y Helen Safa a las siguientes integrantes de la sección: Elva Orozco Mendoza (Drexel University), Premio Elsa Chaney por su trabajo, “Las Madres de Chihuahua: Maternal Activism, Self-Disclosure, and the Politics of Visibility”; Rosario Fernández (Goldsmiths, University of London), Premio Helen Safa por su trabajo, “Domestic Labour in Chile: Questioning Difference”.

Los premios, dotados cada uno de un reconocimiento monetario de US\$500, fueron decididos por un comité de evaluación compuesto por Beatriz Padilla, Cristina Wolff e Isabela Cabral Félix de Sousa. El comité tuvo en cuenta los criterios establecidos para cada premio, incluyendo especialmente la calidad de los trabajos y su referencia directa a la situación de las mujeres o las relaciones de género en Latinoamérica. En el caso del Premio Safa, se tuvo en cuenta que el trabajo abordara la intersección entre género y empleo, según lo estableciesen los requisitos para ese premio.

Otros Saberes

Reunión de negocios, Lima 2017

La reunión tuvo efecto el día domingo 30 de abril de 2017 con la asistencia de aproximadamente 25 personas. La agenda consistió en los siguientes puntos: informe anual, lectura de la misión, propuestas y perspectivas y elección de nuevos consejeros.

Informe anual 2016–2017

Respecto al primer punto, el presidente de la sección, Genner Llanes Ortiz presentó lo siguiente: Desde la última reunión de negocios en LASA Nueva York, la membresía de la sección aumentó de 53 a 133 de acuerdo a la última cuenta. Con esta nueva membresía, la sección tendrá derecho a tres paneles patrocinados en el próximo LASA en Barcelona. Y además se contaba con un fondo (en mayo de 2017) de US\$1,339.

El sitio web institucional de la sección (<http://lasa.international.pitt.edu/sections/otrossaberes/>) se encontraba inactivo hasta ese momento y como consejo se iba a elaborar un plan de comunicación para darle más vida. Este sitio tendría que vincularse a otros sitios “Otros Saberes” creados en etapas anteriores, como: <http://lasa.international.pitt.edu/eng/specialprojects/otrossaberesawardees.asp>, y <https://lasa-4.lasa.pitt.edu/members/special-projects/files/OtrosSaberesLASA.pdf>. El plan de comunicación también incluiría otras herramientas como la lista de distribución oficial de boletines creada por iniciativa de Alejandro Cerda a través de MailChimp: seccionotrossabereslasa@gmail.com, así como el grupo de discusión en Google, creado por Ángela Stuesse: <https://groups.google.com/otros-saberes-lasa> y también una página en Facebook.

Se anunció también que el Consejo de la Sección en un proceso de elección interna seleccionó a Alejandro Cerda como segundo co-presidente (co-chair), junto con Genner.

Se habló de la relación con la Sección ERIP (Ethnicity, Race and Indigenous Peoples), la cual no ha ido más allá de lo personal. ERIP realizará su conferencia en noviembre de 2017 en Morelia, México y hay una invitación abierta a inscribir paneles.

Finalmente, se anunció la creación de un segmento llamada “Otros Saberes” en la revista *LACES (Latin American and Caribbean Ethnic Studies)* a iniciativa de Nancy Postero y Genner Llanes. Los asistentes pidieron más información respecto a este nuevo apartado en la revista y se acordó compartir las bases de esta convocatoria permanente y promover este espacio entre las y los integrantes de la sección.

Lectura de la misión

Alejandro Cerda explica a los y las asistentes que la Sección Otros Saberes es una de las más nuevas en LASA. Su participación se da a fin de socializar los objetivos de la sección a los y las nuevas integrantes. Apuntó que se trata de dar unos minutos para introducir una discusión más amplia. Para eso se dio lectura a un documento que es la misión publicada ya en la página de la sección. La comentó de manera breve resaltando los cuatro intereses principales de la sección, a saber: (1) la práctica y la disseminación de investigaciones surgidas de la colaboración entre productoras y productores de conocimiento, tanto de la academia como de la sociedad civil; (2) la producción de conocimiento generador de teoría y principalmente orientado a promover la acción en torno a los

problemas sociales más apremiantes de los tiempos actuales; (3) un trabajo académico orientado a la justicia social, claramente posicionado respecto a aquellas y aquellos afectados directamente por las persistentes desigualdades de nuestras sociedades, y en alianza con las y los protagonistas de esfuerzos de transformación de dichas condiciones, y; (4) el reconocimiento de múltiples sistemas de conocimiento, con un claro interés en hacerlos dialogar.

A continuación, se abrió el espacio a participaciones de los asistentes. Aida Hernández surgió abrir un espacio para discutir esto a través de Google Groups. Alejandra Navarro apuntó que, si bien la sección se origina a partir de los conocimientos de los pueblos indígenas y afro-descendientes, la idea es ir más allá. Tirso Gonzales comentó que Latinoamérica se está reconstituyendo epistemológicamente y hacia el norte también, y que a partir de los flujos migrantes se está reconstruyendo el continente. Agregó que hay una serie de experiencias que nos indica el potencial de publicación, se refirió a las aportaciones de las experiencias indígenas y de otros pueblos, y que no están siendo visibilizadas. Además de otras producciones indígenas. Alejandro propuso retomar estos apuntes para continuar la discusión y sugirió pasar a lo siguiente.

Propuestas y perspectivas 2017–2018

A continuación, la secretaria de la sección, Alejandra Navarro-Smith, recordó que en Lima 2017 hubo 28 paneles en el track Otros Saberes y que hubo uno patrocinado por la sección, así como un taller directamente organizado por el Consejo. En el siguiente LASA, la sección podrá contar con hasta tres mesas patrocinadas. En este sentido, Alejandra preguntó a las y los asistentes, ¿qué temas les parecerían

relevantes a tocar en las mesas que la sección patrocinaría en 2018.

Entre los principales temas que se sugirieron estuvieron los de la migración internacional (indígena, africana, entre otras) a Europa, el de Otros Saberes como una toma de la ciudad, las alianzas transatlánticas de resistencia frente a la derechización, así como las expresiones de anarquismo, la construcción de solidaridad con el zapatismo y la re-construcción de comunidades en la diáspora. También se sugirió abordar tres escenarios epistémicos actuales: la re-occidentalización, la des-occidentalización y la decolonialidad. Las y los integrantes del Consejo tomaron nota de estas sugerencias.

También anunció Alejandra la intención de llevar a cabo un pre-congreso en Barcelona 2018, el cual tendría como objetivo ofrecer un espacio paralelo de reunión y discusión para los y las integrantes de la sección, que no estuviera sujeto a las restricciones de participación y de ingreso que caracterizan a LASA. Aida Hernández compartió que en Lima, las socias de la Sección de Género organizaron un evento que contó con el apoyo de las anfitrionas peruanas y donde se desarrollaron discusiones relevantes para las integrantes. La idea es hacer algo semejante en Barcelona. Ante esta idea, Bruno Bringel comentó que él cuenta con contactos en el movimiento Comunitaria en el Estado español que pondría a disposición de la sección. Se habló también de la necesidad de formar un sub-comité que apoyara en la organización (además del Consejo). Ambas propuestas encontraron buenos oídos.

Elección de nuevos consejeros

Finalmente, la consejera Ángela Stuesse anunció que, debido a un acuerdo interno de la sección, se había acordado renovar

solamente a una parte del Consejo de la Sección cada año, de forma que solamente la mitad de los consejeros y las consejeras así como uno de los co-presidentes siguiera desempeñando su responsabilidad, cuando nuevos integrantes se sumen. Así, las compañeras Emiko Saldívar e Irma Velásquez Nimatuj habían decidido dejar el cargo, a fin de permitir la renovación de una parte del Consejo. Por lo tanto, se anunció que a partir de la reunión de negocios y hasta el 19 de mayo, se abriría la convocatoria para la elección de nuevos consejeros. El proceso de votación, se dijo, se realizaría a través del sistema electrónico de LASA en tiempos que dependerían de la disponibilidad de la gente de enlace. Y con este anuncio, se dio por concluida la reunión.

Las votaciones para elegir a los nuevos consejeros concluyeron el 21 de junio de 2017 resultando electos: Mariana Mora (CIESAS Ciudad de México) y Adam Coon (Universidad de Minnesota, Morris). ■

NEWS FROM LASA

LASA Membership Report 2016

LASA membership trends held steady in 2016, as the charts below show. The year ended with just under 12,000 individual members, close to last year's record total. As in 2015, about a quarter of members were students, and about half were Latin American residents, who now outnumber U.S. residents among LASA members. New members made up about a quarter of the total individual membership. As in past years, history, political science, literature, sociology, and anthropology were the disciplines most represented among members.

Institutional membership continued to decline, a trend that is expected to continue in 2017 as LASA's flagship journal, the *Latin American Research Review*, changes to online-only, open access publication, so that institutions no longer need to purchase subscriptions. ■

Figure 1. Individual members




Figure 2. Member composition




Figure 3. Individual members




Figure 4. Member residency




Figure 5. Members by discipline





Figure 6. Institutional members



New LASA Membership Dues

by ANGELINA COTLER, LASA Director of Membership and Development

LASA is aware of the costs of becoming a member of our association. LASA current membership costs only account for two separate salary classifications, one for Latin America and another for the rest of the world. Given the geographical and income diversity of our current membership, LASA is moving toward a more comprehensive and fair model to account for intraregional income disparities and new membership categories for members outside academia and for students.

By the end of the year, LASA will enact new membership rates using a two-dimensional model based on the Human Development Index (HDI) of the United Nations and the World Bank classification of income economies to account for income differences worldwide. Our new model will also incorporate new membership categories to account for independent scholars, government officials, grassroots activists, retired professors, etc.

The two models categorize countries on four levels, combining the World Bank classifications of income economies (high income, upper-middle income, lower-middle income, and low income) and the United Nations Human Development Index (very high, high, medium, and low), according to three development aspects: (1) levels of wealth within the country measured by GDP per capita and adjusted for purchasing power parity; (2) education, measured by the percentage of the population in education at particular age and literacy levels; and (3) health measured by life expectancy at birth.

Combining the two indices LASA will categorize countries as follows:

WORLD BANK	UNITED NATIONS
High-income economies	Very high human development
Upper-middle-income economies	High human development
Lower-middle-income economies	Medium human development
Low-income economies	Low human development

Around 85 percent of countries coincide at the same level under both classifications. For instance, Chile is classified by the World Bank as a high-income economy and the United Nations classifies it as having very high human development. Countries that did not coincide on both lists were placed in LASA's second category, which allows discounted membership. For instance, Argentina was classified by the United Nations under the very high human development category, but the World Bank classifies it only as an upper-middle-income economy. Therefore, LASA placed Argentina and all countries in that same situation in the second category, so that people from those countries can benefit from lower membership rates. The adoption of these indices will involve a yearly reevaluation of countries using the most recent United Nations and World Bank classifications.

Given these changes, new membership dues are shown in the following chart according to salary, affiliation, and country of residence.

	Category 1	Category 2	Category 3	Category 4
INDIVIDUAL MEMBERSHIP CATEGORIES				
\$200,000 and over	\$ 327	\$ 327	\$ 327	\$ 327
\$135,000 - \$199,999	\$ 272	\$ 272	\$ 272	\$ 272
\$100,000 - \$134,000	\$ 227	\$ 227	\$ 227	\$ 227
\$80,000 - \$99,999	\$ 189	\$ 189	\$ 189	\$ 189
	100%	60%	47%	34%
\$60,000 - \$79,999	\$ 158	\$ 94	\$ 74	\$ 53
\$50,000 - \$59,999	\$ 131	\$ 78	\$ 62	\$ 44
\$40,000 - \$49,999	\$ 109	\$ 65	\$ 51	\$ 37
\$30,000 - 39,999	\$ 91	\$ 54	\$ 43	\$ 31
\$20,000 - 29,999 (old under 30,000)	\$ 76	\$ 45	\$ 36	\$ 26
10,000 - 19,999	\$ 61	\$ 36	\$ 29	\$ 21
Under 10,000	\$ 50	\$ 30	\$ 23	\$ 17
Independent or Non-Affiliated Scholar	\$ 70	\$ 42	\$ 33	\$ 24
Retired Academic	\$ 60	\$ 36	\$ 28	\$ 20
Graduate Student	\$ 50	\$ 30	\$ 23	\$ 17
Undergraduate Student	\$ 35	\$ 21	\$ 16	\$ 12
Professional / Executive	\$ 350	\$ 350	\$ 350	\$ 350
Lifetime	\$ 3,900	\$ 3,900	\$ 3,900	\$ 3,900








COUNTRIES

Andorra	Albania	Armenia	Afghanistan
Aruba	Algeria	Bangladesh	Angola
Australia	Antigua and Barbuda	Bhutan	Benin
Austria	American Samoa	Bolivia	Burkina Faso
Bahrain	Argentina	Botswana	Burundi
Belgium	Azerbaijan	Cabo Verde	Cameroon
Bermuda	Bahamas	Cambodia	Central African Republic
British Virgin Islands	Barbados	Egypt, Arab Rep.	Chad
Brunei Darussalam	Belarus	El Salvador	Comoros
Canada	Belize	Equatorial Guinea	Congo, Dem. Rep
Cayman Islands	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Gabon	Côte d'Ivoire
Channel Islands	Brazil	Ghana	Djibouti
Chile	Bulgaria	Guatemala	Eritrea
Croatia	China	Guyana	Ethiopia
Curaçao	Colombia	Honduras	Gambia, The
Cyprus	Costa Rica	India	Guinea
Czech Republic	Cuba	Indonesia	Guinea-Bissau
Denmark	Dominica	Iraq	Haiti
Estonia	Dominican Republic	Kenya	Lesotho
Faroe Islands	Ecuador	Kiribati	Liberia
Finland	Fiji	Kosovo	Korea, Dem. People's Rep.
France	Georgia	Kyrgyz Republic	Madagascar
French Polynesia	Grenada	Lao PDR	Malawi
Germany	Iran, Islamic Rep.	Micronesia, Fed. Sts.	Mali
Gibraltar	Jamaica	Moldova	Mauritania
Greece	Jordan	Mongolia	Mozambique
Greenland	Kazakhstan	Morocco	Nepal
-	-	-	...

Category 1	Category 2	Category 3	Category 4
Guam	Lebanon	Myanmar	Niger
Hong Kong SAR, China	Libya	Namibia	Nigeria
Hungary	Macedonia, FYR	Nicaragua	Papua New Guinea
Iceland	Malaysia	Pakistan	Rwanda
Ireland	Maldives	Palestine, State of	Senegal
Isle of Man	Marshall Islands	Paraguay	Sierra Leone
Israel	Mauritius	Philippines	Solomon Islands
Italy	Mexico	Samoa	Somalia
Japan	Montenegro	São Tomé and Príncipe	South Sudan
Korea, Rep.	Oman	South Africa	Sudan
Kuwait	Palau	Sri Lanka	Swaziland
Latvia	Panama	Tajikistan	Syrian Arab Republic
Liechtenstein	Peru	Timor-Leste	Tanzania
Lithuania	Romania	Turkmenistan	Togo
Luxembourg	Russian Federation	Tonga	Uganda
Macao SAR, China	Saint Kitts and Nevis	Tunisia	Yemen
Malta	Saint Lucia	Ukraine	Zimbabwe
Monaco	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	Uzbekistan	
Nauru	Serbia	Vanuatu	
Netherlands	Seychelles	Vietnam	
New Caledonia	Suriname	West Bank and Gaza	
New Zealand	Thailand	Zambia	
Northern Mariana Islands	The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia		
Norway	Trinidad and Tobago		
Poland	Turkey		
Portugal	Uruguay		
Puerto Rico	Tuvalu		
Qatar	Venezuela, RB		
San Marino			
Saudi Arabia			
Singapore			
Saint Maarten (Dutch part)			
St. Martin (French part)			
Slovak Republic			
Slovenia			
Spain			
Sweden			
Switzerland			
Taiwan, China			
Turks and Caicos Islands			
United Arab Emirates			
United Kingdom			
United States			
Virgin Islands (U.S.)			

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